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Abstract 
 
The existing Chinese banking system was born out of a state-planning framework focussed 
on the funding of state-owned enterprises. Despite the development of a modern banking 
system, numerous studies of Chinese banking point to its high level of average inefficiency. 
Much of this inefficiency relates to the high level of non-performing loans held on the banks 
books. This study argues that a significant component of inefficiency relates to a defunct 
bureaucratic incentive structure. Using bootstrap non-parametric techniques the paper 
decomposes cost- inefficiency into X-inefficiency and rational inefficiency caused by 
bureaucratic rent seeking. In contrast to other studies of the Chinese banking sector, the paper 
argues that a change in the incentive structure and the competitive threat of the opening up of 
the banking market in 2007 has produced reduced inefficiency and improved performance.     
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1.  Introduction 
 
Studies of bank efficiency in China have been in vogue among Chinese scholars for a 
number of years1. These studies have been partly prompted by the impending opening up of 
the banking system to foreign competition at the end of 2006. The advent of greater foreign 
competition has galvanised the banking authorities into a strategy of recent and planned IPO 
listings of the major state banks and increased stake holdings by foreign banks of the smaller 
commercial banks. The strategy of allowing a larger stake holding in the Chinese banking 
system by foreign banks as a means of improving efficiency has a good academic pedigree. 
The link between privatization and efficiency improvement in former government owned 
enterprises is now very much an established finding (Megginson and Netter, 2001). The link 
between privatization of banking and efficiency improvement is an emerging research area 
(see Megginson, 2005 for a survey).  
Given the impending listing of the major state owned banks and the tacit acceptance 
of larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks, it is not surprising that 
bank efficiency in China has become a popular subject of research in recent years. A number 
of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been in published in Chinese scholarly journals 
but to date there have been only a few studies that are available to non-Chinese readers2.   
Inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad management and poor 
motivation. In the parlance of Leibenstein (1966), this efficiency gap is termed 'X-
inefficiency'. The Chinese banking sector has only recently begun to open up to foreign 
competition. In the context of a banking sector that was formerly an organ of the state system 
of planning, this paper argues that the measure of bank inefficiency represents the outcome of 
a rational process and is less symptomatic of a managerial malaise. In other words this paper 
                                                 
1 For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue and Yang, (1998) and Zhao (2000) 
have used non-parametric methods while  
2 A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric methods by Fu and Heffernan (2005) 
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argues that inefficiency is symptomatic of ‘rent seeking’ behaviour and not just X-
inefficiency in the traditional sense. 
 This research has three objectives. First it aims to deal with the problem caused by 
non-performing loans in the use of loans as a measure of bank output. Former studies of bank 
efficiency in China have used the stock of loans as one of the measures of output. The large 
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) and the divestiture of large tranches of NPLs from 
the balance sheets of the state-owned banks into the asset management companies have 
distorted this particular output measure. As a means of dealing with this distortion, we 
subtract all NPLs from the book value of loans as a measure of output. An alternative 
measure of output we use, that does not involve the distortion caused by NPLs is interest 
earnings.  
Second, the paper decomposes the measure of Cost efficiency (CE) in Chinese banks 
into technical efficiency (TE), and allocative efficiency (AE). Proponents of the X-efficiency 
(XE) view argue that TE is consistent with XE. However, with reference to the minimum cost 
point of operation, overall efficiency must be measured in terms of cost efficiency. This paper 
argues that while the underutilization of factors is consistent with the notion of X-
inefficiency, the wrong factor-mix is indicative of rational decision making and 'rent-seeking'. 
The decomposition of cost inefficiency into X-inefficiency (technical inefficiency) and rent-
seeking inefficiency allows us to examine their evolution over the sample period.     
Third, this paper aims to provide an inferential capability to the point-estimates of 
efficiency through the use of bootstrapping methods. The question this part of the analysis 
poses is, are the measures of relative efficiency significantly different from the benchmark? 
Are the measures of X-inefficiency and 'rent-seeking' statistically significant? The threat of 
entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market will lead to improved management, which will 
result in improved technical efficiency and lower cost- inefficiency as incumbent banks 
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attempt to cut costs and consolidate their balance sheets. How can the improvement in 
efficiency be evaluated?   
This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section discusses the 
literature and outlines the non-parametric method of estimating bank efficiency. Section 3 
discusses the measurement of inefficiency and discusses the difference between X-
inefficiency and ‘rent-seeking’ inefficiency. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology of 
bootstrapping as applied to the non-parametric method. Section 5 discusses the results and 
section 6 concludes. 
  
2. Methodology and Literature Review 
Most studies of banking efficiency have focussed on the developed economies3. 
While there have been some studies of other Far Eastern economies4, the number is small in 
comparison. Indeed, Berger and Humphrey's (1997) survey of 130 studies of frontier analysis 
in 21 countries, only 8 were about developing and Asian countries (including 2 in Japan). 
Studies on US financial institutions were the most common, accounting for 66 out of 116 
single country studies. 
The basis of the non-parametric method of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) is the 
extension by Charnes et al. (1978)  (CCR)5 of the single input-output model of Farrell (1957) 
to a multiple input-output generalisation. Technical efficiency (TE) is measured as the ratio 
of projected output (on the efficient frontier) to actual input used. There are a number of 
papers that describe the methodology of DEA as applied to banking6, what follows is a brief 
description. 
                                                 
3 Drake and Hall (2003), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), Drake (2001) Altunbas and 
Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993) 
4See Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Karim (2001), Laevan (1999), Katib and Matthews  (1999), Chu and Lim 
(1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995) 
5 Charnes et. al (1978) popularised the DEA method. Tavares (2002) produces a bibliography of DEA (1978-2001). There are 3203 DEA 
authors whose studies cover a wide range of fields. Banxia.com also compiles DEA papers from 1978 to the present. 
6 The most recent being Drake (2004) 
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Let us say that there are N banks. Let xi represent the input matrix of the ith bank, and 
yi represent its output matrix. Let the KxN input matrix be denoted X and the MxN output 
matrix be denoted Y. The efficiency measure of each of the N banks is maximised by the 
DEA searching for the ratio of all weighted outputs over all weighted inputs, where the 
weights are selected from the dual of the linear programming problem specified as: 
qlq ,min  
subject to   
0
0
0
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³+-
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i
   (1) 
where f is an Nx1 vector of constants q is a scalar and is the economic efficiency score of the 
ith bank (0 < q  < 1). 
The estimation of cost efficiency involves the comparison of minimum cost at the 
optimal factor inputs to actual cost at the observed factor inputs. The minimisation exercise 
becomes: 
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   (2)   
where iw  is a vector of input prices for the i
th bank and *ix is the cost minimising vector of 
inputs for the ith bank. A graphical illustration helps to differentiate the two concepts in the 
case of constant returns to scale technology (CRS).  
 Figure 1 shows an isoquant qq producing a given output with factor inputs x1 and x2 
and isocost ww,  which traces the ratio of factor prices. The efficient cost minimising position 
is shown at e where ww is tangential to qq. Employing a factor combination shown by point 
c, which is to the right of the isoquant qq indicates that the firm is technically inefficient. 
Efficiency is decomposed into technical efficiency and allocative efficiency (AE).  
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Figure 1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical efficiency (TE) is measured by the ratio Oa/Oc. The cost to the firm is 
shown by w''w'' which is parallel to ww and passes through point c. Cost efficiency (CE) is 
measured by Ob/Oc and Ob/Oa gives allocative efficiency (AE). It can be seen therefore 
from this decomposition that under constant returns to scale (CRS); 
   
TE
CE
AE =    (3) 
However, the CCR model under the assumption of CRS is only appropriate when all 
banks are at the optimal scale. This requires that the Decision Making Units (DMUs) operate 
on the flat portion of the long run average cost curve. However, scale inefficiency can be 
estimated for by altering the CCR model to allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). Banker 
et. al (1984) (BCC) accounts for scale effects by estimating the most productive scale size for 
each DMU while identifying its technical efficiency7. Therefore technical efficiency is further 
                                                 
7 Coelli (1996) shows that the use of the CRS specification when some of the banks are not operating at the optimal scale will result in 
measures of technical efficiency that are mixed up with scale efficiency. 
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decomposed into measures of pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). 
Hauner (2005) demonstrates that under the assumption of VRS, cost efficiency (CE) can be 
further decomposed by the formula; 
   CE = AE.SE.TE  (4) 
DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practice amongst the decision-
making units (DMUs). An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in relation to this 
frontier. An efficiency score is constructed under both CRS and VRS. If the efficiency score 
of each bank produced by these models differ significantly, then the banks are said to 
experience variable returns to scale (Avkiran, 1999). In the case of VRS, a model can be 
orientated either by using input minimisation (efficiency gain through input reduction – input 
orientation) or output maximisation (efficiency gain from output expansion – output 
orientation).   
DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or output orientation) and 
functional form8, however the results are sensitive to the choice of inputs and outputs. The 
weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes data are free from measurement errors. 
Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a relative way, its analysis is confined to the 
sample used. This means that an efficient DMU found in the analysis cannot be compared in 
a straightforward way with other DMUs outside of the sample.  
A small but growing industry of efficiency studies of Chinese banks has emerged in 
recent years that have used DEA to measure relative efficiency9. The consensus of finding 
from the DEA studies is threefold. First, because of a continued banking reform programme 
technical inefficiency has been declining over time. Second, average bank efficiency is lower 
in the state owned banks (SOBs) than in the joint stock banks. Third, the gap between the two 
has been narrowing in recent years. 
                                                 
8 Hababou (2002) and Avkiran (1999) provide a relatively thorough discussion of the merits and limits of the DEA. 
9 In addition to the papers cited in footnote 1, other studies by Chinese scholars that have used non-parametric techniques include Xu, 
Junmin and Zhennsheng (2001), Zhang and Li (2001), Fang et. al. (2004).  
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3. Rational inefficiency  
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) argue that X-inefficiency constitutes 20% or more of bank 
costs. Proponents of the theory of X-efficiency suggest that the familiar average cost curve of 
a firm is a ‘thick band’ rather than a thin line. The band defines a range of costs per given 
level of output, which will depend on the application of pressure and motivation on the 
personnel employed10. Poor motivation and weak pressure resulting in under utilization of 
factors of production, is part of what Leibenstein (1975) describes as ‘organisational 
entropy’. X-inefficiency arises as a result of low pressure for performance. Some institutions 
would be protected by government regulation that would reduce the external pressure of 
competition. But even with a higher degree of pressure from the environment, firms may 
have organisational deficiencies so that management signals and incentives are lost in the 
hierarchy of the organisation.  
Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and X-efficiency 
interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept they are not 
necessarily the same. The concept of technical efficiency derives its basis from the neo-
classical theory of the firm and assumed profit maximising behaviour. A firm or a bank may 
be technically inefficient for technical reasons such as low training or human capital levels of 
managers and workers, or the use of inferior or out-of-date technology. The diffusion of new 
technology is not instantaneous and some firms or banks may lag behind others in the 
acquisition and utilisation of new technology. With further training and updating of capital, 
the firm or bank can expect to move towards the efficient frontier. X- inefficiency is not 
caused by the variability of skills or the time variability of technology diffusion but by the 
use and organisation of such skills and technology. 
                                                 
10 See for example Franz (1988) 
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Leibenstein and Maital (1992) suggest that X-inefficiency and its composition can be 
measured through the use of DEA analysis. The partitioning of the efficiency scores enables 
the differentiation between motiva tional factors and management deficiency. Leibenstein and 
Maital (1992) argue that the slack analysis of efficiency is a means of separating the 
proximate causes of X-inefficiency including management performance11.  
The two main scalars produced by DEA ana lysis is theta (?), which measures that 
portion of X-inefficiency that could be eliminated by the proportional reduction of inputs. 
However, even after reducing inputs, some inputs may still exhibit slack12 which is measured 
by iota (?). Iota measures the total amount of X-inefficiency and therefore the direct 
management deficiency is measured by ? – ?.  
A slacks based measure of efficiency has been proposed by Tome (2001) which 
specifically incorporates the slacks into the objective function. This procedure amounts to 
recognising that in the case of the input-oriented measure of DEA, some organisations may 
be on the flat part of the isoquant of Figure 1 that is parallel to the axis, so that a further 
reduction in input could be obtained without sacrificing output13. Formally, the system 
described by (1) is replaced by; 
   )(min ,
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Where S- and S+ are input and outputs slacks respectively. The existence of input 
slacks is a violation of the neo-classical assumptions of diminishing returns in production in 
                                                 
11 Chen (2001) uses the decomposition to identify management X-inefficiency in Taiwan’s banks. 
12 See Zhu (2003) pp. 39-45 
13 This procedure has been applied to the examination of banks in Hog Kong by Drake et al (2006) 
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the output oriented case and diminishing marginal productivity of factor inputs in the input 
oriented case.  
An alternative interpretation of slacks in production is ‘rent seeking’ in the sense of 
Buchanan (1980) and Tullock (1967, 1980).  Rent seeking in its basic form is the 
appropriation of surplus in the process of production or exchange without any real 
contribution to the process of either. Where there are government regulations on enterprise, 
barriers to entry and other anti-competitive rules, officials have the opportunity to extract 
rents through the mechanism of bribery and corruption. Therefore the term rent seeking has 
been generally associated with extortion, bribery and corruption. While it is generally 
accepted that corruption is fairly widespread in the financial sector in China, a number of 
high profile cases have made this subject a matter of contemporary concern14. The fall-out 
from a number of well-publicized cases could have the effect of reducing activity in this 
particular area.   
However, a hidden but much more pervasive type of rent seeking is the extraction of 
larger budgets for bureaucracies and what results in the non-pecuniary rewards to workers in 
government owned enterprises (Tullock, 1967 and McKenzie and Tullock 1981).  The 
prestige of the senior bureaucrats is enhanced if the size of the workforce is expanded to be 
larger than necessary to meet production targets. Similarly, offices are more grandiose, 
holidays are longer, and benefits are greater and so on.  
Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that the existence of slacks in production is the 
outcome of a rational decision making process that represents on-the-job compensation to 
managers. Whereas X-inefficiency is viewed by Leibenstein (1966, 1978) as non-maximising 
behaviour, Stigler (1976) argues that its existence is symptomatic of firms maximising their 
individual utility functions. Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) propose that the slacks be part of 
                                                 
14 The former Governor of the Construction Bank of China Wang Xuebing was sentenced to 12 years jail for accepting bribes of 1.15 
million Yuan. The Vice-President of the Bank of China received a suspended death sentence for embezzling 14.5 million Yuan and 
accepting bribes of 1.4 million Yuan. See also Fan, Rui and Zhao (2006) 
 11 
the preference set of managers rather than the technology of production. Faced with a target 
level of output, a give set of inputs and factor prices, the bureaucrat minimises costs subject 
to a utility function that includes in it arguments the level of output and a subset of factor 
inputs. In other words for the ith bank, given the K factor inputs, the bureaucrat minimises 
costs to meet a utility function which contains the M outputs and a subset J of factor inputs, 
given standard neo-classical technology.   
   ( )( )ijimikk xyUUx ,,0, ,min --¢= lwD  
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The FOC show that an allocative inefficiency is created that favours factors inputs xj above 
that implied by the optimal factor mix. In the context of figure 1, the ray from the origin to 
the tangency point e on figure 1 defines the optimal factor mix. At point 'a' the DMU is 
technically efficient but is allocatively inefficient. A bank can organise its input factors to be 
on its production frontier but be using the wrong factor mix. Rent seeking in monopolistic 
public utilities involves over-staffing, 'elaborate offices and a lot of trips to important 
conferences' or 'expensive subsidised restaurants' (McKenzie and Tullock, 1981). The wrong 
factor mix in the case of the Chinese banking sector can be interpreted as excess staffing15. 
The management of the banks may reduce technical efficiency (X-inefficiency as it has been 
                                                 
15 In the case of pre-reform China, the bureaucratic bank manager would have been instructed to employ a quota of graduates from the 
central bank sponsored universities, and schools as well as retirees from the Peoples Army Officer Corps. 
 12 
sometimes interpreted) by moving the cost frontier from w''w'' to w'w', but would still remain 
cost inefficient as shown by the gap ab/Oc. The gap between the minimum cost optimal 
factor mix and the technically efficient minimum cost associated with the efficient production 
frontier with the sub-optimal factor mix (or allocative inefficiency) can be interpreted as the 
inefficiency associated with 'rent seeking' 16.    
 
4.0 Data and Bootstrapping 
This study employs annual data (1997-2004) for 15 banks; the four state-owned banks, ten 
joint-stock commercial banks and one joint-venture bank. Data for one of the joint-stock 
banks was unavailable for 2004 (China Everbright) and in that year 14 banks data was used. 
The total sample consisted of 119 bank year observations. The main source of the data was 
Fitch/Bankscope and the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (various). The choice of 
banks was based on the fact that they face a common market and compete nationwide. The 
one joint-venture bank in the sample is an example of a bank that has strong foreign 
intervention and would according to the consensus of evidence, be expected to exhibit a high 
level of efficiency, even though it can be argued that as a regional bank it would not 
necessarily be competing in the same markets as the other banks in the sample.  
Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank input and 
output. Under the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and liabilities 
measure inputs.  In contrast, inputs in the production approach are physical entities such as 
labour and capital and the outputs are the flows of income generated from the different 
channels of bank services. In this study, we consider two sets of outputs. First, we use three 
inputs and three outputs selected under the intermediation approach for the estimation of 
technical efficiency. Traditionally the intermediation approach would use as inputs the 
                                                 
16 Crain and Zardkoohi (1980) suggest that X-inefficiency and rent seeking co-exist and that changes to X-inefficiency are offset by equal 
changes in rent seeking, so that there is a trade-off between one type of inefficiency against another. 
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number of employees (LAB), fixed assets (FA) and total deposits (DEP), and outputs would 
be total loans, other earning assets (OEA), and other operating income (NII). However, the 
operation of the Asset Management Companies in stripping out large tranches of NPLS from 
the state-owned banks distorts the use of loans as a valid output measure. We therefore 
consider the quality of the loan portfolio by stripping out non-performing loans (NPLs) from 
the stock of loans for each bank (LOANSQ). The argument for adjusting loans for NPLs is to 
mitigate the effect of the large loan portfolios held by the big-4 SOBs on the efficiency 
calculation. The unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the efficiency score upwards for the 
SOBs which have the largest share of loans but also the highest proportion of NPLs.  
The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the factor prices 
of the relevant inputs above. We distinguish between the price of labour (PL), price of fixed 
capital (PK) and the price of funds (PF). The price of labour is obtained as the ratio of 
personnel expenses divided by employees. The price of fixed capital is operating expenses 
less personnel expenses divided by fixed assets (less depreciation).  
The second of the set of outputs used is interest income (II) and non- interest income 
(NII). The advantage of these measures is that are relatively uncontaminated by the NPL 
problem. Interest income will represent the income generated from active loans and not 
NPLs. While non- interest income is relatively undeveloped in China, it is selected to reflect 
the growing contribution of this channel to bank’s total income. 
The availability of uniform and comparable data on Chinese banking is a very recent 
development. Researchers have typically made a number of working assumptions to fill the 
gaps in data. In general, balance sheet data is available although the data revisions alter the 
figures from year to year and up until recently the accounting standards of Chinese banks 
differed from international standards (Ng and Turton 2001). The number of employees are 
available for the big four state owned banks but not for all of the joint-stock banks over all 
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years. Similarly, the availability of personnel expenses varies across banks. In the years that 
personnel expenses were not available, the ratio of personnel expenses to total operating 
expenses in the adjacent year to the missing was applied. In the years where the number of 
employees was not available, the ratio of labour to fixed assets in the most recent year 
available was applied17. Where there were no personnel expenses available, it was assumed 
that the bank faced the same capital costs as banks of comparable size, which gave personnel 
costs as a residual.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 2004 as a 
snapshot indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high standard deviation is an 
indication of the dominance of the 4 state owned banks. 
 
Table 1: Output-Input Variables 2004 (million RMB) 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation 
LOANSQ Loans adjusted for NPLs  861,603 972690.4 
OEA Other Earning Assets 572,112.7 698281.2 
NII Non-interest income  3,306.0 5083.0 
II Interest Income 49,995.9 59,974.9 
LAB Number employed (labour) 110,050.4 172260.9 
DEP Total Deposits 1,403,333.1 1766172.3 
FA Fixed Assets (less depreciation) 23,455.5 30074.6 
PL Price of labour .08 .046 
PF Price of funds .01 .020 
PK Price of fixed assets .64 .279 
Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various) and author calculations from 
web sources . 
  
One of the criticisms levelled at the DEA approach is that it produces estimates of 
efficiency that are not open to statistical inference. In other words if a DMU has a score of 
0.95, in what statistical sense is it 5% inefficient relative to the benchmark? Without the 
capability for statistical inference, non-parametric methods would be weak alternatives to 
parametric methods of estimating efficiency. However, uncertainties also exist in the 
                                                 
17 Fu and Heffernan (2005) assume that the employee growth matches the growth of total assets and they use the average wage paid by 
state-owned and other types of financial institutions to estimate labour cost. 
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estimation of efficiency using DEA. The most obvious uncertainty is what comes from 
measurement error. Measurement error in the context of data on Chinese banks is particularly 
acute. There are three potential sources of error. First, differences between local bank's 
accounting procedures and those of international bodies, second differences between local 
bank's accounting conventions and third, researcher assumptions relating to the generation of 
missing observations. Other uncertainties arise from the estimation of the efficiency frontier; 
changes to the inputs and/or outputs can cause large differences in the resulting scores. 
Furthermore there may be errors in the sampling variation caused by the difficulty in 
obtaining a sufficiently large and consistent sampling frame.  
 Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b) propose a bootstrap procedure for non-
parametric frontier models. Bootstrapping is based on the notion that if the data can be 
viewed as a random sample from an underlying population under a model (data generating 
process - DGP), then the process of continuous random draws from the sample under the 
model generates also random draws from the population. The random draw can be viewed as 
a pseudo-sample and as a group of new benchmarks to compute the efficiency score for a 
given point. Following the Simar-Wilson method, 1000 bootstrap values of the individual 
DMU for all types of efficiency scores are generated in each year18. It is not the intention of 
this paper to give a detailed explanation of the Simar-Wilson bootstrapping method but a 
brief description of the method and algorithm is provided below.   
Following Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b). The efficiency scores calculated 
with the original data are used to construct pseudo data. The bootstrap procedure is based on 
the idea that there exists a DGP, which can be determined by Monte Carlo simulation. By 
using the estimated distribution of the DGP to generate a large number of random samples, a 
set of pseudo estimates of the efficiency scores iqˆ  are obtained. However this 'naive' 
                                                 
18 Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have been conducted by Löthgren and Tambour (1999); in the case of banking efficiency by 
Casu and Molyneux (2005); and in the case of Chinese rural credit cooperatives, Dong and Featherstone (2004). 
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bootstrap yields inconsistent estimates (Simar and Wilson, 2000a). A homogeneous bootstrap 
procedure that produces consistent values of iqˆ  from a kernel density estimate is given in 
Simar and Wilson (2000b). The bootstrap algorithm is summarised in the following steps19.  
Step 1. Compute the original DEA efficiency scores using the linear programming model 
(equation 1) and let ii qd ˆ/1ˆ = ; 
Step 2. Since radial distances are used, we will refer to the polar coordinate of the input 
vector of each DMU x defined by its modulus xxx ¢== )(ww  and its angle 
1
2
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Step 3. Compute the estimated covariance matrices 1Sˆ , 2Sˆ  of L and LR by 
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SS
SS
    ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
=S
2221
1211
1
ˆ
SS
SS
 
where 11S  is )1()1( -+´-+ NMNM , 2112 SS ¢=  is 1)1( ´-+ NM and 22S  is a scalar, and 
compute the lower triangular matrices 1L  and 2L  such that 111ˆ LL ¢=S  and 222ˆ LL ¢=S  via the 
Cholesky decomposition. 
Step 4. Choose an appropriate bandwidth h as described in Simar and Wilson (2000b) using 
the information in L~ , 1Sˆ , 2Sˆ . 
Step 5. Draw K rows randomly, with replacement from the augmented matrix L~  and denote 
the result by the )( NMK +´  matrix *~L ; compute *z , the 1´K  row vector containing the 
means of each column of *~L . 
                                                 
19 The algorithm is run on MATLAB and the codes are available from the authors on request. 
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Step 6. Use a random number generator to generate a )( NMK +´  matrix e of i.i.d. standard 
normal pseudo-random variates; let .ie  denote the ith row of this matrix. Then compute the 
)( NMK +´  matrix *e  with the ith row *.ie  given by jii L¢= .
*
. ee  so that )ˆ,0(~
*
. jNMi N S+e  
where j=1 if the ith row of *~L  was drawn from rows 1, . . . , K of L~ , or j=2 if the ith row of 
*~L  was drawn from rows (K + 1), . . . , 2K of L~ . 
Step 7. Compute the )( NMK +´  matrix ***2/12 )~()1( zihLMh K Ä+++=G
- e  
where KKK iiKIM ¢-= )/1(  is the usual KK ´  centring matrix with KI  denoting an identity 
matrix of order K, Ki  an 1´K  vector of ones, and Ä denotes the Kronecker product. 
Step 8. Partition G  so that [ ]321 iii ggg=G , where Mi R+Î1g , [ ] 12 2/,0 -Î Ki pg  and 
),(3 +¥-¥Îig  for i = 1, . . . , K. Define the )( NMK +´  matrix of bootstrap pseudo-data 
*L  
such that the i the row *iz  of 
*L  is given by 
î
í
ì
-
³
=
otherwise
z
iii
iiii
i )2(
1)(
321
3321*
ggg
gggg
 
Step 9. Translate the polar coordinates in *L  to Cartesian coordinates. This yields the 
bootstrap sample { }Kiii yx 1** ),( = .  
Step 10. For the given point (x, y), compute ),(ˆ* yxq  by solving the DEA program taking 
{ }Kiii yx 1** ),( =  as the benchmarks and compute the bias-corrected efficiency scores 
*2 ˆ/ˆ),(~ qqq =yx  
Step 11. Repeat Steps 5~11, obtain another group of bias-corrected efficiency scores, 
reducing the input vector of each DMU x into xq
~
. Compute the cost efficiency scores using 
equation(2) from the reduced inputs and outputs. 
 Step 12. Similar to Step 11, obtain rent-seeking-efficiency scores (the difference between 
cost-efficiency score and technical (X)-efficiency score) 
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Step 13. Repeat Steps 5~12 B (=1000) times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates 
{ }Bbb yx 1),(~ =q  and cost efficiency scores and x-efficiency scores. 
 
5.0 Empirical Results 
 Table 2 presents the results of the bootstrap estimation. For reasons of brevity we 
present the results for five years and for CRS only but the relatively small sample in each 
year could bias the scale efficiency estimates, which raises doubts about the VRS 
assumption20.  Furthermore the evidence of scale economies in banking is mixed. Early 
studies tended to confirm the existence of constant returns to scale21, however more recent 
findings suggest that there are significant scale economies for large banks22. Finally, the 
bootstrap estimates under the VRS assumption showed implausibly low levels of cost 
efficiency and no difference between the estimates of cost efficiency and technical efficiency 
(no scale or allocative inefficiency) for all but two of the JSBs (for both types of output). The 
SOBs had implausibly high scores for cost and technical efficiency. In favour of the CRS 
measure, the estimates of cost efficiency obtained this way are similar to the findings of Fu 
and Heffernan (2005) for roughly the same sample period using stochastic frontier methods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The cluster of four large state-owned banks biases the scale efficiency estimates for the big-4.     
21 See Hunter and Timme (1986) and Berger et. al. (1987). 
22 Berger and Mester (1997) and Altunbas and Molyneux (1996). 
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Table2 
Bootstrap Estimates of Inefficiency: 2000-2004, (%) CRS 
Bank Output 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
  X Rent X Rent X Rent X Rent X Rent 
NPL 51.7*** 20.3*** 49.1*** 29.6*** 48.4*** 22.1*** 33.7*** 35.0*** 35.7*** 27.4*** ABOC 
Prod 43.7*** 17.5*** 41.7*** 22.4*** 25.3*** 29.8*** 38.5*** 26.0*** 40.1*** 20.9*** 
NPL 23.2*** 13.8** 19.6*** 27.8*** 18.6*** 0 18.0*** 0 20.4*** 0 BOC 
Prod 23.1*** 0 18.8*** 0 17.1*** 0 19.1*** 0 20.8*** 0 
NPL 38.7*** 23.7*** 40.3*** 18.4*** 33.1*** 23.0*** 10.0*** 44.2*** 14.2*** 35.1*** CCB 
Prod 42.1*** 4.4*** 41.9*** 15.9*** 18.8*** 24.5*** 18.2*** 31.4*** 27.0*** 23.4*** 
NPL 45.7*** 15.6*** 44.0*** 10.6*** 28.7*** 24.6*** 26.9*** 26.6*** 31.6*** 22.6*** ICBC 
Prod 35.9*** 15.3*** 44.2*** 7.1*** 14.8*** 22.1*** 37.1*** 15.3*** 29.1*** 22.9*** 
NPL 38.1*** 0 33.2*** 0 27.5*** 21.4*** 14.9*** 33.6*** 16.3*** 29.1*** BCom 
Prod 30.0*** 0 29.3*** 0 22.1*** 17.5*** 34.5*** 16.2*** 36.0*** 5.7*** 
NPL 30.6*** 20.2*** 25.2*** 21.4*** 34.4*** 0 22.6*** 15.3*** 26.7*** 8.9** CITIC 
Prod 20.4*** 8.0*** 20.0*** 31.1*** 22.7*** 5.8*** 26.6*** 16.9*** 34.8*** 4.4** 
NPL 18.7*** 30.7*** 27.5*** 12.9** 41.2*** 0 41.5*** 0 46.1*** 0 CMB 
Prod 34.0*** 5.3*** 16.1*** 34.5*** 23.6*** 0 25.6*** 13.0** 45.6*** 0 
NPL 12.6*** 29.4*** 14.0*** 29.3*** 13.1*** 21.1*** 17.8*** 8.5** 14.7*** 15.0*** CMBC 
Prod 15.1*** 26.6*** 11.3*** 26.9*** 6.5*** 21.0*** 21.9*** 0 13.1*** 16.5*** 
NPL 33.6*** 15.3*** 28.9*** 17.2*** 34.9*** 8.5*** 28.0*** 11.0*** - - EVBRT 
Prod 29.5*** 17.0** 24.3*** 20.3*** 21.0*** 8.4*** 25.9*** 10.6** - - 
NPL 46.1*** 0 57.8*** 0 31.0*** 0 30.0*** 0 21.5*** 0 FSB 
Prod 42.4*** 0 34.4*** 0 23.5*** 0 16.1*** 0 7.9** 0 
NPL 28.1*** 28.3*** 24.5*** 20.6*** 22.4*** 22.8*** 16.6*** 19.8*** 27.9*** 14.4*** GDB 
Prod 21.6*** 30.3*** 26.8*** 22.5*** 9.6*** 7.7* 19.9*** 10.6*** 18.7*** 19.8*** 
NPL 23.3*** 29.2*** 27.5*** 24.6*** 26.6*** 10.2*** 12.6** 28.1*** 19.7*** 20.0*** HXIA 
Prod 25.7*** 34.6*** 16.7*** 35.2*** 14.4** 14.4*** 30.7*** 12.4*** 35.2*** 11.6*** 
NPL 18.8*** 34.6*** 23.5*** 0 21.3*** 16.1*** 14.8*** 22.7*** 33.5*** 0 IBCL 
Prod 34.8*** 26.1*** 19.5*** 29.6*** 16.1** 9.2** 22.9*** 9.9*** 26.2*** 13.8** 
NPL 27.3*** 34.8*** 17.3*** 25.9*** 14.3*** 23.9*** 13.5*** 24.8*** 8.8*** 30.6*** SDB 
Prod 20.4*** 36.7*** 21.2*** 30.7*** 13.3*** 10.3** 24.6*** 10.6*** 19.0*** 13.9* 
NPL 25.3*** 40.0*** 26.0*** 28.4*** 31.8*** 5.9* 32.6*** 0 34.0*** 0 SPB 
Prod 26.3*** 32.9*** 24.5*** 29.3*** 28.8*** 0 23.6*** 9.8* 32.9*** 0 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% 
 
The significant pattern than can be gleaned from Table 2 is the general decline in both 
types of measured inefficiency over time. Other patterns that emerge from careful 
observation is the frequency of coincidence of zero cells in the rent-seeking inefficiency 
boxes for both measures of output and the frequency of commonality of the estimates. 
However, it is not easy to glean patterns from simply ‘eye-balling’ the data. Table 3 
summarises the average of the bootstrapped DEA scores for the full sample broken down into 
X-inefficiency and Rent seeking inefficiency for the state-owned banks (SOB) and Joint-
stock banks (JSB), for the two different sets of outputs.  
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Table 3 
Mean inefficiency, NPL adjusted loans and Production method (CRS)   
 
 
X-inefficiency Rent-Seeking Inefficiency 
SOB NPL – adjusted output 
 
36.4% 30.6% 
JSB NPL – adjusted output 
 
31.3% 18.8% 
‘t’ statistic for difference in 
mean 
1.70* 3.90*** 
SOB – production method 
output 
30.6% 30.2% 
JSB – production method 
output 
25.7% 20.3% 
‘t’ statistic for difference in 
mean 
2.39** 2.89*** 
Correlation coefficient – all 
banks  
0.5324*** 0.7249*** 
Spearman’s Rank correlation 
– all banks 
0.4019*** 0.7244*** 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%  
 
The first two rows of Table 3 show the mean inefficiency estimates for the full sample 
for the SOBs and JSBs. The third row shows that the differences in the means are statistically 
significant. Similarly, the mean inefficiency scores for the SOBs and JSBs using the 
production method are shown rows four and five. Again the ‘t’ test shows significant 
difference in means. So in contrast to the consensus of finding, Table 3 shows that the SOBs 
have a significantly higher level of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency than the 
JSBs. The two output sets produce remarkably similar measures of inefficiency. A correlation 
over the full sample shows a significant relation (row 7) and the ranking of banks efficiency 
by the different output methods show a significant commonality (row 8).  
However, the important question is how do these relative measures of efficiency 
evolve over time?  We address this question by regressing the change in the respective 
measure of inefficiency on its lagged value. The estimated coefficient on the lagged value of 
inefficiency can be treated as the parameter of adjustment. A significant negative value 
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indicates that inefficiency is declining (efficiency improving). The larger the absolute value 
of the parameter, the faster the speed of adjustment. The regressions are conducted as a panel 
of the form tititi YY ,1,, eba ++=D -  with heteroscedastic adjustment of the standard errors. 
The results are shown in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Beta value Inefficiency adjustment, CRS  
Inefficiency Bank Group b - NPL 
adjusted 
t value b - 
production 
method 
t value 
SOB -.197 -3.05*** -.671 -3.50*** 
JSB -.543 -8.29*** -.877 -10.07*** 
X-
inefficiency 
All Banks -.454# -8.13*** -.826 -10.42*** 
SOB -.826 -7.09*** -.448 -3.19*** 
JSB -.507 -5.59*** -.489 -5.10*** 
Rent-
seeking 
All Banks -.648 -7.51*** -.469 -6.00*** 
# with SOB intercept dummy, *** significant at the 1% 
  
The most important result of Table 4 is that under both definitions of output there is 
strong statistical evidence of a negative trend in both types of inefficiency.  In this respect, 
the results of this paper differ from the findings of Chen et. al. (2005) who find no discernible 
trend improvement in cost efficiency23.  The speed of decline in X-inefficiency (improvement 
in technical efficiency) is less for the SOBs than the JSBs, on both measures but it is 
particularly marked in the case of the NPL adjusted Loans. One can infer that once NPLs 
have been removed the big 4 collectively are much closer to the frontier than the JSBs and 
thus the speed of reduction of inefficiency is commensurately lower. There is a faster speed 
of decline of rent-seeking inefficiency by the SOBs in the NPL adjusted case but no 
significant difference in the speed of decline of rent-seeking inefficiency in the production 
case. While the results are mixed relating to the differences in the speed of adjustment of the 
                                                 
23 Chen et. al (2005) uses a wider data frame of banks, including regional joint-stock banks and international trust and investment 
companies. It can be argued that the use of DMUs that do not compete in the same geographical market or product is a violation of the 
homogeneity requirement of DEA. 
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two sets of banks, the common finding is that both types of inefficiency has declined 
significantly during this period for all the banks in the sample.  
 Using parametric methods, Fu and Heffernan (2005) find cost inefficiency in the 
order of 50% over the period 1993-2002. These findings are consistent with the bootstrap 
estimates obtained here and also the broad findings of Chinese scholars cited in this paper. 
Such findings have typically generated a consensus of pessimism about the future of Chinese 
banking. Our findings suggest grounds for optimism in that in terms of relative efficiency, 
Table 3 shows that the trend is towards improved performance.  
6.0  Conclusion   
This paper argues that cost inefficiency can be partitioned into X-inefficiency and 
rent-seeking inefficiency. If this decomposition is accepted then it follows that part of the 
cost- inefficiency of Chinese banks is not due to managerial malaise but rational decision 
making. It is the case then that the implication for the current thrust of official bank policy in 
China is positive. According to Leibenstein (1966), X-efficiency is improved through 
managerial motivation and external pressure. Impending competition and the deregulation of 
the Chinese banking market can be expected to motivate managers to improve performance 
and utilise existing factors of production fully. Competition for well-qualified staff between 
the different banking firms will raise rewards and attract the best graduates. The potential 
outflow of the best staff to the higher paying institutions will motivate a greater focus on 
training, modernization and efficiency. 
Bureaucratic rent seeking is a rational response to a particular set of incentives based 
on the dictates of planning policy. It would be no surprise to learn that over the years of 
protected growth, as the banks were vessels for the channelling of unprofitable loans to state-
owned enterprises, the response of the banking sector was to develop rent seeking strategies 
and act as employment sponges for the educated youth in China. It can be expected that the 
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dismantling of protection and the invitation to list the state-owned banks and the joint stock 
banks will alter the incentive structure for managers and consequently there should be a trend 
reduction in rent-seeking inefficiency. 
This paper has used non-parametric methods to conduct an analysis of inefficiency in 
a sample of Chinese banks. The estimates of bank inefficiency were buttressed with 
bootstrapping techniques to enable statistical inference. In general, the estimates from 
bootstrapping support the view that relative efficiency has improved. However, these results 
must still be interpreted with caution. The improvement in efficiency is in terms of the 
benchmark banks, which are themselves 'best-practice' Chinese banks. The real benchmarks 
should be foreign banks competing on an equal footing or foreign banks operating in their 
home countries under similar conditions of development and risk.   
It is not the intention of this paper to paint a rose hued picture of the state of Chinese 
banking. Managerial problems and corporate governance issues still bedevil banking in 
China. However, the argument of this paper is that the threat of an open market to foreign 
banks has resulted in significant improvements in bank efficiency, with faster improvements 
being shown by the JSBs. The main message of this paper is that a change in the incentive 
structure has motivated Chinese bank managers to ‘up their game’. Consequently, Chinese 
banks are in better shape than they have ever been. 
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